The following email (and incorporated attachment) is a continuation of the written critical exchange arranged with libertarian writer George H. Smith in the summer of 2003 as a paid critique service for the purpose of obtaining some logical analysis of the philosophical basis of the Self-Sovereign Individual Project by a knowledgeable libertarian thinker. (See Link Note)
Paul's inline comments follow George's intact email and incorporated WORD attachment critique of the early September 2003 version of the Declaration of Individual Independence, annotated version. Current DOII_annotated.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Part Five
Date: Tue, 2 Sep 2003 17:35:00 -0500
From: "George H. Smith"
To: "Paul Antonik Wakfer"
Paul,
Enclosed is Part Five. Please read my note at the end of
this part, after the time record..
George
Part Five
Start time: 4.42 pm.
20) I have used the phrase "semantic contents" because modern neuroscience has reached the stage where some of the biochemical and neurological contents of one human brain can be determined by another. However, true mind reading is nowhere in sight and many scientists doubt with good reason that this will ever be possible for human brains as they are now constructed and organized. I think that it is fair to say that for many centuries to come the statement which I have made will remain valid. The second sentence above follows logically from the first sentence and those truths stated prior to it. By "cannot be significantly determined" I mean here that the amount of possible a priori determination of a person's choices and actions is small, unreliable and not useful for any practical purpose.
I'm frankly not sure why any of this is relevant to the fundamental points you wish to make. I'm not even sure what you are referring to, and I suspect other readers will have similar problems. If you are referring to the Church-Turing thesis, or to theories about a Turing Machine that have been used in connection with speculations about Artificial Intelligence, then I think the problems are philosophical rather than scientific. And if this is so, then you needn't add the caveat that your statements will be true merely "for many centuries." (If you have not done so already, you may wish to consult articles and books by John Searle on this topic, e.g., The Rediscovery of the Mind, M.I.T. Press, 1992).
VI. that even though all human adults have separate and uniquely different individual purposes, there exists a set of social needs, responsibilities and entitlements which, each of us agreeing to, mutually, consistently and concurrently optimizes the potential of each of us to achieve his individual purposes; and that to enable that optimization of potential, this compossible set needs to be recorded as a manifest mutual understanding, a "natural social contract", specifying the relationships between self-sovereign individuals, and executed by each adult.
I think you need to provide an explicit definition of "compossible," since this is a technical word often used in philosophy but rarely used in ordinary discourse.
I also think you need to clarify what you mean by "natural," since this is one of the most ambiguous words in all of philosophy. (I know you address this briefly later on, but I think it should be placed earlier in your discussion and perhaps be explained in more detail.)
22) Even though humans are unique individuals with a large part of their being only minimally understandable to each other…
Again, it is quite possible to have more than a "minimal" understanding of other people. We might ask: minimal by what standard? You seem to answer, "Minimal when compared to my understanding of myself." This is true in the trivial sense that other people cannot directly experience what I experience, but I don't see why this is a relevant criterion. I don't think it is nonsense to say that in some respects other people can know me better than I know myself, given that the capacity for self-deception appears to be boundless among human beings.
The fundamental point is that (so far as I can tell) none of your moral arguments depends on this digression. They can stand up without it.
However, in order to optimize human lives within a social context, what must be attempted is to ascertain the social requirements (ie. the requirements of human behavior which directly affect other humans) of humans from a study of the common aspects of each human's "individual purposes". Not only must these social requirements or meta-needs be determined, but to be implemented they need to be formulated into a clear written contract detailing the responsibilities and entitlements with respect to all other humans to which the executor of the contract intends to adhere in his interactions with them."
I agree with the former part of this statement, but not with the latter. There is no obvious reason why the social conditions of happiness need to be formulated into a clear written contract in order to be effective. Historically speaking, social customs and conventions (so-called "unwritten laws") have sometimes played a much greater role in fostering a free society than have explicitly formulated documents. A document can do no more than state the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the people who subscribe to it; and it is ultimately those beliefs (i.e., convictions), values, and attitudes that will make the difference, whether or not they are set down in a written document.
This does not mean that a "written contract" might not be desirable, but I think this should be defended on other grounds.
By "social" or "meta"-needs, I mean a set of human requirements of existence which are necessary to provide an environment in which more direct human needs can then be optimally satisfied. For example, it is the meta-need of having one's life, liberty and property reasonably safe from violation which must be in place before humans can safely and satisfactorily invest in wealth accumulation and trade for the many material goods and services which directly benefit their lives and happiness.
It is misleading to use the term "meta-need" in the context of social needs. The prefix meta suggests something that is more fundamental than other needs, and I don't think this is what you wish to say.
Even though the creation and promotion by Jean Jacques Rousseau of the idea of a "social contract" in 17624 was highly collectivist and thus, very different in nature than mine, my purpose is nevertheless similar to that which he stated: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. Note that I use the description "similar" because Rousseau's notion of "defend and protect with the whole common force", suggests that there must be a uniform collective entity which is doing this defending and protecting, rather than allowing these services to arise spontaneously from the marketplace.
Your differences with Rousseau run far deeper than what you here indicate. Rousseau was operating from a concept of the "general will," and this has absolutely no analogue in your philosophy. The passage you cite cannot be adapted to your purposes, even with your qualifications. It means something very different. There are passages in various Lockean philosophers -- and I am thinking specifically of some passages in Part Two of Thomas Rights of Man -- that would serve your purpose much better.
In spite of the use of the term "social contract" by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Rawls and many others to describe something quite different, I have still chosen to use that name because it is the most correct phrase to describe the purpose of what is required by a self-sovereign individual in contractually declaring his meta-needs, responsibilities and entitlements with respect to his fellow human beings. I have also used the name Natural Social Contract because my document is more true to human nature and any of those preceding it and because, by doing so, it is my desire and my hope to see it eventually replace those distortions of the phrase "social contract".
It is not just that the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls differ from you own -- they also differ a great deal from each other. The theories of Locke and Rousseau, for example, are vastly different, even when viewed in terms of fundamentals. At best, the term "social contract" signifies a general tradition in political thought, not a specific theory. The spirit of your own social contract has a distinctively Lockean ring about it, especially as it was developed by later theorists, such as Thomas Paine, who argued that people surrender none of their "natural liberty" when entering civil society via a "social contract." This is essentially the same point you wish to make.
Stop: 5.18 pm.
Total Time: 36 min.
Previous time remaining: 28 min.
Time: minus 8 min.
There is obviously a lot that I did not cover in your annotations. If you have two other passages that you would especially like me to comment on, send them to me and I will do the best I can.
George
[Although Paul never sent the response comments below to George Smith (since George never replied to the others, what was the point?), as with the previous responses, George's original is indented in dark blue while Paul's comments are in black.]
20) I have used the phrase "semantic contents" because modern neuroscience has reached the stage where some of the biochemical and neurological contents of one human brain can be determined by another. However, true mind reading is nowhere in sight and many scientists doubt with good reason that this will ever be possible for human brains as they are now constructed and organized. I think that it is fair to say that for many centuries to come the statement which I have made will remain valid. The second sentence above follows logically from the first sentence and those truths stated prior to it. By "cannot be significantly determined" I mean here that the amount of possible a priori determination of a person's choices and actions is small, unreliable and not useful for any practical purpose.
I'm frankly not sure why any of this is relevant to the fundamental points you wish to make. I'm not even sure what you are referring to, and I suspect other readers will have similar problems. If you are referring to the Church-Turing thesis, or to theories about a Turing Machine that have been used in connection with speculations about Artificial Intelligence, then I think the problems are philosophical rather than scientific. And if this is so, then you needn't add the caveat that your statements will be true merely "for many centuries." (If you have not done so already, you may wish to consult articles and books by John Searle on this topic, e.g., The Rediscovery of the Mind, M.I.T. Press, 1992).
The statement is an elaboration of fact of the mental separation and essential unknowability of one individual by another. That elaboration is additional validation of the point that one's individual purposes are both different from and essentially unknowable by another individual. The point of all this is to make it clear that any attempt by one person to make another happy is bound to fail (which also strengthens the axiom that an individual's happiness is his sole responsibility). In particular, any attempt to deliver joint happiness by application of a kind of collective "Golden Rule" is bound to fail. The point of all this is to prepare for the next statement which appears to be an exception to the essential uniqueness and separation of each individual by the other.
As for artificial intelligence and related matters, clearly I am talking about mind reading which per se has no connection with that.
VI. that even though all human adults have separate and uniquely different individual purposes, there exists a set of social needs, responsibilities and entitlements which, each of us agreeing to, mutually, consistently and concurrently optimizes the potential of each of us to achieve his individual purposes; and that to enable that optimization of potential, this compossible set needs to be recorded as a manifest mutual understanding, a "natural social contract", specifying the relationships between self-sovereign individuals, and executed by each adult.
I think you need to provide an explicit definition of "compossible," since this is a technical word often used in philosophy but rarely used in ordinary discourse.
I had already done so in previous text within the annotated document. However, since this is the first usage within the DOII, I have now inserted "ie. "compossibly" from "com" - together, and "possible"" in parenthesis after the words "mutually, consistently and concurrently" for which I use "compossible" as a single descriptive term. In addition, when finally completed all words which are unusual or used in unusual ways will be linked to glossary definitions.
I also think you need to clarify what you mean by "natural," since this is one of the most ambiguous words in all of philosophy. (I know you address this briefly later on, but I think it should be placed earlier in your discussion and perhaps be explained in more detail.)
Instead, I have simply removed the word from that point in the text. It was more a title word in any case. "Social contract" is the only phrase necessary at that point.
22) Even though humans are unique individuals with a large part of their being only minimally understandable to each other..
Again, it is quite possible to have more than a "minimal" understanding of other people. We might ask: minimal by what standard? You seem to answer, "Minimal when compared to my understanding of myself." This is true in the trivial sense that other people cannot directly experience what I experience, but I don't see why this is a relevant criterion. I don't think it is nonsense to say that in some respects other people can know me better than I know myself, given that the capacity for self-deception appears to be boundless among human beings.
The understanding of one person by all but the most intimate others is "minimal" by any objective standards that you can name. But yes, the standard of one's understanding of oneself is certainly a good one to use. This is true not only because others "cannot directly experience what I experience", but even moreso because they also are not privy to my evaluations/emotions and cannot evaluate/emote things as I do. If you think that self-deception is an essential or even dominant characteristic of a mature, rational human being, then you and I are clearly miles apart in our viewpoint of what constitutes a "mature, rational human". I do "think it is nonsense to say that in some respects other people can know me better than I know myself". If you want to say: "many people are so self-deceptive that in some respect others can know them better than they do of themselves", then I would agree. However, my reply is that these people are not mature rational individuals. They are not people to whom the DOII and the Natural Social Contract is intended to appeal. Furthermore, even with these people my statement is not incorrect. The understanding of such people is minimal (relative to how much of their decisions and actions such understanding can explain) by all possible methods including their own introspection.
The fundamental point is that (so far as I can tell) none of your moral arguments depends on this digression. They can stand up without it.
The essential purpose of enunciating the "minimal understanding of each other" fact of the reality about humans is that it refutes any suggestion that one person can unilaterally make another person happy, and therefore it strengthens the notion that each person's happiness must necessarily be his own responsibility. The purpose is to eliminate such essentially vacuous and thoroughly impractical notions as: "let's all just be nice to one another and live happily together". Not that I disagree with such statements. It is only that they are completely insufficient as the basis for ordering society - just as the non-aggression principle is, by the way. My arguments for what is the optimal way to proceed (which are based on the best way to achieve the highest possible happiness and the least possible harm, rather than on the existence of any rights) would lose much of their strength without this being made clear.
However, in order to optimize human lives within a social context, what must be attempted is to ascertain the social requirements (ie. the requirements of human behavior which directly affect other humans) of humans from a study of the common aspects of each human's "individual purposes". Not only must these social requirements or meta-needs be determined, but to be implemented they need to be formulated into a clear written contract detailing the responsibilities and entitlements with respect to all other humans to which the executor of the contract intends to adhere in his interactions with them."
I agree with the former part of this statement, but not with the latter. There is no obvious reason why the social conditions of happiness need to be formulated into a clear written contract in order to be effective.
The "obvious reason" is that unless they are written down they are not fully defined and they cannot be easily learned, fully known and clearly understood. It is for the same "obvious reason" that the "rule of law" and not of men required laws to be written in clear unambiguous detail. For this codification of the general rules is exactly what the Natural Social Contract achieves.
Historically speaking, social customs and conventions (so-called "unwritten laws") have sometimes played a much greater role in fostering a free society than have explicitly formulated documents.
That is only because "historically speaking" written documents were first impossible and then hard to do. Verbal communication of customs and conventions was simply much more efficient. However, we are now in the 21st century, one of paperless documentation. Why continue to use stone age methods? Besides as I stated above, these social requirements for optimal human intercourse need to be written in unambiguous, detailed form for exactly the same reason as have all laws.
A document can do no more than state the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the people who subscribe to it; and it is ultimately those beliefs (i.e., convictions), values, and attitudes that will make the difference, whether or not they are set down in a written document. This does not mean that a "written contract" might not be desirable, but I think this should be defended on other grounds.
It is quite true that "A document can do no more than state the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the people who subscribe to it", but when these have any degree of complexity they are not usually understood by all persons in precisely the same manner. Even written formulation will not make this certain, but it will certainly help, partly because more easily than verbal communication it allows study, questions, comments and elaborations of the meanings of its statements.
By "social" or "meta"-needs, I mean a set of human requirements of existence which are necessary to provide an environment in which more direct human needs can then be optimally satisfied. For example, it is the meta-need of having one's life, liberty and property reasonably safe from violation which must be in place before humans can safely and satisfactorily invest in wealth accumulation and trade for the many material goods and services which directly benefit their lives and happiness.
It is misleading to use the term "meta-need" in the context of social needs. The prefix meta suggests something that is more fundamental than other needs, and I don't think this is what you wish to say.
It is not misleading; "meta" also implies "prior", "outside" or "above"; and "prior and more fundamental" is exactly what I mean to say. Social needs are meta-needs in the sense that they are more fundamental and prior to the needs for food, shelter, love, etc. They are the conditions under which one can attain, keep and use food, shelter, love, etc.
Even though the creation and promotion by Jean Jacques Rousseau of the idea of a "social contract" in 1762 was highly collectivist and thus, very different in nature than mine, my purpose is nevertheless similar to that which he stated: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before." Note that I use the description "similar" because Rousseau's notion of "defend and protect with the whole common force", suggests that there must be a uniform collective entity which is doing this defending and protecting, rather than allowing these services to arise spontaneously from the marketplace.
Your differences with Rousseau run far deeper than what you here indicate. Rousseau was operating from a concept of the "general will," and this has absolutely no analogue in your philosophy.
I indicated that when I stated that his social contract was "highly collectivist".
The passage you cite cannot be adapted to your purposes, even with your qualifications. It means something very different.
I disagree with your first statement, because I take the meaning from only the words that I have excerpted rather than anything else written about it. My purpose was not to lean on any kind of authority for support, but merely to show that even a philosopher with such a very different approach shared the same major requirement for a social contract which I do. This is because such a need for a social contract is directly inherent in the reality of man.
There are passages in various Lockean philosophers -- and I am thinking specifically of some passages in Part Two of Thomas Rights of Man -- that would serve your purpose much better.
No, since my purposes were to show that even someone as diametrically opposed to my ideas as Rousseau still basically needed a social contract for the same purposes as I do. I was not looking for "support" from any Lockean philosophers, with all of whom I have major differences and think made major errors.
In spite of the use of the term "social contract" by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Rawls and many others to describe something quite different, I have still chosen to use that name because it is the most correct phrase to describe the purpose of what is required by a self-sovereign individual in contractually declaring his meta-needs, responsibilities and entitlements with respect to his fellow human beings. I have also used the name Natural Social Contract because my document is more true to human nature than any of those preceding it and because, by doing so, it is my desire and my hope to see it eventually replace those distortions of the phrase "social contract".
It is not just that the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls differ from you[r] own -- they also differ a great deal from each other. The theories of Locke and Rousseau, for example, are vastly different, even when viewed in terms of fundamentals. At best, the term "social contract" signifies a general tradition in political thought, not a specific theory.
My statement above does not imply that I considered the others similar to each other, but I have altered the text to make that clear. Afternote: now that I have again reviewed the quote from Rousseau, I have decided to remove it after all, since it does not describe the most essential aspects of my Natural Social Contract.
The spirit of your own social contract has a distinctively Lockean ring about it, especially as it was developed by later theorists, such as Thomas Paine, who argued that people surrender none of their "natural liberty" when entering civil society via a "social contract." This is essentially the same point you wish to make.
While it is true that people need surrender none of their natural liberty within society, that is not the major point of my Natural Social Contract which is instead, total responsibility for one's actions. At this point it is clearer than ever to me that I should not have asked for your review before the completion of the Natural Social Contract. Since you have not seen my Natural Social Contract, there is really no way that you can make such a statement concerning its similarity to that of "later theorists, such as Thomas Paine". Furthermore, it is false that anyone who advocates any form of government, no matter how minimalist, can be logically arguing that "people surrender none of their "natural liberty" when entering civil society via a "social contract".
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